How Kibaki's gimlet eyes espied Somalia's southern coastline
By A/Rasaq H. Nuurre Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield stated in their book, The Maritime Political
Boundaries of the World, that since Tanzania and Kenya agreed to use a parallel
of latitude as their maritime boundary north of Pemba Island, Kenya's exclusive
economic zone narrows as it proceeds seawards. They also explicitly explained in
the book that it is unlikely that Kenya's geographical disadvantage, created by
the alignment of the coast, will persuade Somalia that the line of equidistance
is inequitable. Contrarily, the incompetent Somalia's weak unity government
which only controls few blocks in the capital, Mogadishu, signed uneven
memorandum of understanding on Somalia-Kenya maritime boundary with the Kenyan
government on April 7, 2009 in which, Consequently, Kenya uncovered more
strategies to claim large part of Somalia's territorial water. According to a document submitted to the commission on the limits of the
Continental shelf on May 2009, Kenya affirms strongly that it has overlapping
maritime claims with adjacent coastal state of Somalia and that it has reached a
Memorandum of Understanding with Somalia granting each country no objection in
respect of submissions on the outer limits of the continental shelf to the
Commission on Limits of the Continental shelf. This document is a clear evidence
of what many experts predicted years ago and warned the Somali people that Kenya
insanely yearned and has a great deal of interest the adjacent and unprotected
Somalia's southernmost coastline. This unbridled greed of Kenyan government,
however, intensified since president Mwai Kibaki assumed the office December
2002. Many Somali people, stunned and saddened by the unity government's unexpected
speedy move, have immediately raised their voice against the agreement. They
have suspicion about president Sharif's rapid jump into one of the most
sensitive cases any Somali government would ever involve, the border issue.
Somalia always had border dispute with its two neighboring countries , Ethiopia
and Kenya. Both couturiers had been publicly military allies against Somalia. In
Kenya, for instance, in the eyes of many government officials and some local
obnoxious media outlets, "Somalia had been viewed their most enduring security
headache since independence, starting with what they call 'Shifta movement' that
waged a secessionist war supported by Mogadishu in the 1960s". Thereupon, the
agreement sparked considerable debate between Somali public and Sheikh Sharif's
government causing an angry backlash from almost every spot inside the country
and in Diaspora. For this reason, the BBC Somali Service held first and last open debate on this
maritime agreement on 10/4/2009. The debate was between two government ministers
on one side and two members of the parliament on the other corner. Abdirahman
Haji Adem Ibbi, the deputy prime minister and Abdirahman Abdishakur, the
minister of planing and International Co-operations defended the government's
decision to sign the agreement. Both men are known to have strong ties with
president Sharif; they were among the first handpicked inner circle group of
about 15 ministers their names were handed over to prime minister Sharmarke. So,
the president is fully aware of whatever mission the two men are assigned.
On the other side of the debate, there were then-deputy prime minister Aidid
Ilka Hanaf now MP and deputy of the speaker, Mohamed Omar Dalha. Initially, both
of them criticized the way the agreement was reached and the government's
"deliberate contempt" about the role of the parliament on this issue. In an
interview with Simba Radio days after the agreement was reached, Mr. Dalha
insisted that "the agreement between the two countries was inconclusive since it
has not been through the legal channels", meaning that it was not through the
parliament. Recently he shifted his position to a certain degree from opposing
the agreement to supporting it. Also, several Somali Diaspora members
participated the debate and asked questions. Abdirahman Abdishakur, the minister of planning who hastily signed the agreement
on behalf of the Somali government, was angered several times during the debate
by comments and questions made by some of the listeners; he was adamantly
confronting any one projecting his or her voice against the agreement; at one
point, he demanded from the mediator (Yusuf Nuh Dhule) to either quieten down
the questioners because they were not, on his view, cognizant of the issue of
the maritime and were also off the topic of the discussion, or otherwise the
debate itself was a conspiracy against his government. It was the compassion of the mediator, however, to curb the angry minister and
let the listeners continue to express their views freely; "they have a right to
know about this issue, you know its their country and they are suspicious about
the agreement; they want to know all about this agreement; let them phrase their
ideas about the case and its your responsibility to convince the public and to
answer their questions, Mr. Dhule returned to the minister's criticism. In that debate, the two ministers, ultra-confident all the time, openly defended
the MOU and reiterated that if the Somali government had not sign the Memorandum
of Understanding with the Kenyan government and also had not submit its
continental shelf beyond 200 nm to the UNICLOS before May 13, 2009, Somalia
could lose the right of its continental shelf beyond the 200 nm. None of the two
ministers, however, was an expert on the maritime issue and their attempt to
convince the public was a case in point. Their argument was clearly weak and
based on the article 4 of annex II to the Convention where "a coastal State
intending to establish the outer limits to its continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles is obligated to submit particulars of such limits to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf along with supporting
scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10
years of the entry into force of the Convention for that State". Conversely, as indicated by the Report of the Eighteenth Meeting of States
Parties held in New York on 13-20 June 2008, Somalia had a chance to halt this controversial maritime agreement or the
memorandum of understanding; and similarly, due to Somalia's lack of an
effective government system for many years, the report spared the unity
government to proceed the preliminary document of the outer limits of the
continental shelf to the commission on the limits of the continental shelf on
04/14/09. But, unfortunately, it was the might and the domination of few
ministers in the Somali Council of Ministers plus their foreign advisers that
hindered any effort to postpone this one-sided maritime agreement. Many critics believe that Somali officials should have never been, at the first
place, to the office of the Kenyan foreign ministry to sign unequal agreement
that served solely the interest of the Kenyan government. Somali government, in
the minds of these critics, was not bound by this MOU according to the Report of
the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties held in New York on 13-20 June 2008.
The report clearly states that several delegations pressed during the meeting
that "a failure by a coastal State to meet its 10-year time period required by
article 4 of annex II to the Convention would not deprive it of its entitlement
over the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles". Accordingly, many
countries responded to that and in fact adjourned their submission beyond the
deadline. Thus, its crystal clear that Somali officials should not proceed both
the agreement and the submission of its continental shelf since latter also
requires more time and more focus. Moreover, as the report states, Somalia, due
its long civil war and with no effective and stable government for many years,
should request from the commission not to incorporate, at this time, such
international commitments. Since the collapse of the Somalia's military regime in January 1991, there has
been many attempts by Somalia's neighboring countries particularly Kenya and
Ethiopia to back many fruitless international and regional efforts to restore
any system in Somalia, warlord-ism, transitional governments, or even clannish
regional authorities, as long as these systems safeguard their interests. Both
countries hosted several Somali peace conferences. Alongside these self-interested political endeavors, Kenya, for instance, had
been the powerhouse and the home to many Somali "politicians" for many years.
Some of these politicians have Kenyan passports, others may be even Kenyan
nationals. For example, the deputy prime minister, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adam,
who is at the same time the minister of finance, and the brain power of
president Shariif, traveles with Kenyan passport. Former Somali prime minister,
Ali Mohamed Ghedi, is another example. He resides peacefully in his multi
million dollar palace in the suburbs of Nairobi after he displaced tens of
thousands of his own people.
Unlike Ethiopia, which is the main source and the spiritual leader of many
Somali warlords, Kenya is the most trusted and the safe haven of these
despicable warlords. The warlords use Ethiopia as a traditional power base, but
Kenya is their hideout, power broker and luxury mansion house. Former Somali
warlords and almost every high ranking government officials including the
president himself spend time in Kenya's five star hotels and palaces. They
travel to and from the world through Nairobi or Mombasa airports. In addition,
Kenya is still the main transit camp for thousands of Somali refugees since the
beginning of the civil war nearly twenty years ago. For all these reasons,
Kenyan government has more advantage than any other country in the region to get
access into the current political system in Somalia to ensure its vital national
interest in Somalia, including its recent claim of Somalia's territorial waters
near the Raskiamboni peninsula. Hence, one cannot exclude the possibility of
self-interest above all else even if one holds a ministerial position for the
benefit of the Somali people. Moreover, Kenya is the UN's small Manhattan in East Africa. Many UN and
international organizations have regional headquarters in Nairobi. The office of
the United Nations Political Office for Somalia is one of them. It is
established by the Secretary General "to advance the cause of peace and
reconciliation through contacts with Somali leaders, civic organizations and the
States and organizations concerned". However, according to the preliminary
document submitted by the Somali unity government to the commission on the
limits of the Continental shelf on 04/14/09, in October 2008 the Special
Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould Abdalla,
"initiated the preparation of the preliminary information indicative of the
outer limits of the Continental shelf" and accepted an offer of assistance from
the government of Norway which is an act that indicates the leading role of the
office of SRSG in Somalia political system and how the Somali Unity Government
suffers from self-doubt. Since "Tanzania and Kenya agreed to settle their
maritime boundary dispute , Kenya's exclusive economic zone narrows as it
proceeds seawards. As a result, Somalia's unguarded southernmost coastline came
across the gimlet eyes of Kenya's president Kibaki soon after he took the
office. Kibaki's government made several attempts earlier to sign an agreement
with the previous Somali Transition Federal Government, but all failed due to
unknown reasons. However, the recent Memorandum of Understanding on
Somalia-Kenya maritime boundary between Kenya and Shariif's unity government and
the submission of the preliminary indicative report to the UNICLOS by the
Somalia's unity government with the help of the office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdalla, and
his deputy Mr. Charles Petrie have left many unanswered questions for the Somali
people and for many other observers. What kind of a role the UNIPOS office
played on this controversial agreement? Equally important, It is naive "to make
the assumption that Somalia has an effective government in place whose actions
must be recognized, particularly in establishing national boundaries". And for
this reason, any major boundary agreements between Somalia and other neighboring
countries are contingent on reliable, and fully capable Somali government. By A/Rasaq H. Nuurre
Email: anurre5@gmail.com
Faafin: SomaliTalk.com | June 15, 2009 |