Why capturing Kismayu could trigger proxy wars for Kenya
SOURCE:
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/
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As Kenya’s military campaign in Somalia clocks two weeks, the major cause of
concern among diplomats, military and intelligence experts is starting to
turn from taking over the port of Kismayu to how to manage the aftermath.
File
As the Kenya Army enters the third week of its military campaign in
southern Somalia, the African Union peacekeeping force is upping its
pressure on the Al Shabaab around the capital Mogadishu, with the
plan of “bringing some order” to the war-ravaged country by the end
of December.
In conversations with diplomats, government officials, and
intelligence sources in the region, a clear picture has started
emerging of a war that has been in the making over the past five
years and one that could dramatically reorder the Somali state, and
just possibly bring about the peace that has proved so elusive over
the past two decades.
According to these sources, Kenya’s military offensive was timely,
coming as it did when the Al Shabaab militants are at their weakest
and at a time when there is convergence of opinion in the wider East
African region about what to do about the crisis in Somalia.
However, a clearer strategy crafted by Somali leaders and regional
players in the conflict is also emerging. The first step, the
sources say, is to create three new “areas of influence” in the rest
of Somalia, beside Somaliland and Puntland, which now function as
independent territories.
These territories would provide a buffer zone for Kenya and
Ethiopia. Already, Ethiopia has created a buffer zone spanning
Galgadud, Hiraan, Bay, Bakool and Gedo (See map).
Kenya’s military ambition is to create a buffer zone spanning Gedo
El Wak, Middle and Lower Juba regions.
Ultimately, these regions will be governed as semi-automous states
at first that could one day form part of a strong united federal
government of Somalia.
The second step after the fall of Kismayu would to be to hand over
all “liberated” areas to Amisom.
This, according to diplomats, would mean that the UN Security
Council would be forced to reconsider upgrading Amisom into a
full-fledged mission with the recommended minimum troop level of
20,000 soldiers.
So far, Amisom has about 9,500 troops in and around Mogadishu — and
only two East African Community countries, Burundi and Uganda, have
contributed.
There are plans to add 3,000 soldiers, but no one has offered to pay
for them. Both Uganda and Kenya have been calling on the Security
Council to upgrade Amisom.
The third step down the road, is for Amisom to hand over a pacified
Somalia to the UN.
“If Kenya and other regional players can stabilise Somalia a
little,” Ethiopia’s ambassador to Kenya, Shemsudin Ahmed, told The
East-African last Thursday, “it will require more, not less, support
from the rest of Africa and the international community.
It would make sense to hand over to the UN at that point,” he said.
Ethiopia supports the Kenyan invasion, which mirrors its strategy
five years ago.
Ethiopia, which went to war without the support of the international
community with the exception of America, learnt some hard lessons.
Ethiopia’s foray
After Ethiopia made its foray into Somalia in late 2006 to fight the
Islamic Union Courts regime led, ironically, by the country’s
current President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, to prop up the more
internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government that was
then hiding out in Baidoa, it withdrew just over two years later in
the face of international criticism.
Ethiopia then focused on creating a “buffer” zone with Somalia along
the common border. Amisom already controls the bulk of Mogadishu,
and the plan is for it to also establish a sphere of influence in
Middle and Lower Shabelle and the coastal area of Galgaduud.
Kenya would establish a sphere of influence in Lower Juba, Middle
Juba, and Lower Gedo and, of course, gain access to the key port of
Kismayu, which is also the economic lifeline and greatest strategic
asset of Al Shabaab.
Managing victory
However, as Kenya’s military campaign in Somalia clocks two weeks,
the major cause of concern among diplomats, military and
intelligence experts is starting to turn from taking over the Port
of Kismayu into how to manage victory.
With Amisom increasing pressure in Mogadishu and the Kenya Defence
Force continuing its onslaught in the south, experts told The
EastAfrican that the capability of Al Shabaab to continue fighting
on multiple battlefronts will face a significant challenge.
“There is no doubt we shall get Al Shabaab out,” said a source
within Amisom, “but the key problem for Kenya is management of
victory.
The moment the city of Kismayu falls, who will control it? There is
a major potential for conflict between Kenya and Ethiopia.”
This potential conflict is symbolised by two men who experts say are
being fronted as potential leaders of Jubaland, the new
semi-autonomous state Kenya wants to help establish.
One of the men is former Somali Defence minister and “president” of
the Azania state, Mohamed Gandi, who is said to be favoured by the
bosses of Kenya’s National Security Intelligence Service as well as
the French.
Ethiopians are wary of Gandi because his clan, the Ogadeni, harbour
territorial ambitions of one day creating a super-state carved out
of southern Somalia, southern Ethiopia and a huge chunk of Kenya’s
North Eastern Province.
Then there is Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam, known as Madobe, who is
the leader of the Ras Kamboni Movement that is allied with the
Transitional Federal Goverment.
Madobe is favoured by the Kenya military establishment because he
comes to the table as a commander with troops, while Gandi is a
politician with good business connections.
Managing local politics in Kismayu could easily see Kenya getting
sucked into proxy fights with regional powers such as Ethiopia and
Eritrea that have traditionally characterised the conflict in
Somalia.
There is also the risk of getting entangled in clan politics that
could easily turn the groundswell of support for Kenya by ordinary
Somalis as a liberator and turn it into a foreign occupier.
In order to walk the fine line between invader and liberator, the
Kenyan military has been taking a very cautious approach of turning
over towns that have been captured to the local communities through
the Transitional National Government.
However, when it comes to the port of Kismayu, the situation might
turn tricky fast.
Mr Ahmed however downplays the potential conflict with Kenya over
the establishment of the governing authority in Jubaland, claiming
that Ethiopia has a good working relationship with both Gandi and
Madobe.
However, even the best laid plans of mice and men often go awry.
A few days after the Kenyan incursion, Sheik Sharif threw a spanner
in the works when he opposed Kenya’s military campaign. Everyone
seems to have been caught by surprise, and the Kenya government
wrote to the TGF to demand an explanation.
There was speculation that Sharif was playing to the Somali
nationalist gallery, privately supporting the Kenya action, but
maintaining his national credibility by publicly opposing it.
There seemed to have been widespread agreement too that Sheik Sharif
was wary that the Kenyans were going to instal a regional government
dominated by the Ogadeni clan in Kismayu, and that this would only
create a Jubaland or Azania state that would operate like Puntland
or Somaliland, and entrench the partition of Somalia.
Ethiopian hand
Some commentators saw the secret hand of Ethiopia, which was alleged
to fear that Kenya’s Ogadeni proxy, with the lucrative Kismayu port
and its revenues in its control, would back the Ogadeni National
Liberation Front (ONLF), which is seeking to break away from
Ethiopia and join a dreamed of Greater Somalia.
However, Ethiopia’s ambassador Ahmed denies the latter, telling The
EastAfrican that he and other mission officials in Nairobi “talk
regularly to… Gandi, the Nairobi-based Ogadeni leader and
governor-in-waiting, who is likely to take over in Kismayu.”
He also said the majority of the Ogadeni are in Ethiopia, and they
are leading lights in the politics of Ethiopia’s Somali State.
However, diplomats close to Sharif said a Jubaland or Azania state
is the least of his worries.
Rather, it is his view of the role of Al Shabaab and the period
after the one-year extension of the TFG extension, that is
influencing his remarks on the Kenya campaign.
As for Kampala, it was President Yoweri Museveni who managed to get
Somali groups to agree to extend the term of the TFG, which was
expiring in August, by a year.
The international community, which initially opposed the extension,
were on the spot once the Somalis agreed. Besides Uganda, which has
the bulk of the troops in Amisom, made the argument for extension to
the international community primarily as something that the
peacekeeping forces needed to consolidate the gains they and the TFG
forces were making against Al Shabaab in the Mogadishu region.
Sharif, the diplomats say, is “happy to see the Shabaab expelled
from Mogadishu. But he is not ready to see it defeated.”
This is because, they say, his plan was to use the Shabaab to
continue his stay in power when the extension expires next year.
The plan, they say, would involve Al Shabaab calling for a
ceasefire, then entering into talks with Sharif, on the basis of
which a new transitional government with him at the head would be
formed — and he would thus get another term without an election.
Sharif’s plan, if that is what it is, seems to be unravelling.
Al Shabaab has reportedly asked for a truce, although this must be
seen as a move by the Somali and less hardline faction, not the
foreign faction of the militant organisation, who want to preserve
some of their spoils around Kismayu.
The one thing that all Ethiopian, Kenyan, Ugandan, Burundian and
Amisom officials The EastAfrican spoke to seem to agree on, though,
is that if Sharif or the TFG embrace the Shabaab, then it is over
for him. He would likely be ousted from power in seconds.
Turkish connection
In the meantime, Sharif and other players in Somalia are moving away
from their traditional friends and allies in the Middle East, toward
Turkey.
Turkey’s role, diplomats say, is one of the factors that make this
moment in Somalia ripe for peace.
Turkey is rising as the new Muslim power in the world, and unlike
the theocracies in the Middle East, it is eager to showcase the
“modern” face of Islam, to show that a country can be Muslim and be
a democracy, with free markets, full rights for women, and play a
role in the world without a persecution or victim complex.
Its involvement in Somalia would help more secular and moderate
elements to rise.
Secondly, despite the continuing attacks in Somalia by unmanned US
drones, this time it is the French who are playing a greater role in
the Kenya campaign.
For starters, Gandi is seen as “France’s man.” He is one of the very
few Somalis who speak fluent French and is married to a Frenchwoman.
In the past nearly 10 years that he has lived in Nairobi, most of
his costs have been paid for, a source told The EastAfrican, with
“French money.”
France has assumed a very aggressive, and equally controversial role
in Africa.
It was very forward in using its military to help rebels oust
Laurent Gbagbo from power in Ivory Coast in April this year, after
the strongman lost elections to rival current president
Alassane Ouattara, but refused to hand over power, leading a
resumption of civil war.
France also assumed a high profile in the Nato bombing of the Libyan
dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s embattled regime, to aid the rebels of
the National Transitional Council. Gaddafi was captured, and very
quickly killed in a gruesome incident by rebels in his hometown and
stronghold of Sirte, just over two weeks ago.
France now seems to have turned its attention to East Africa.
President Nicolas Sarkozy became the first French leader of the past
20 years to bury with the hatchet with Rwanda’s ruling Rwanda
Patriotic Front.
The RPF blames French forces who were in Rwanda for collusion with
Hutu extremists in the 1994 genocide, in which nearly one million
Rwandans, most of them Tutsi, were killed.
French authorities, on the other hand, had long blamed the RPF,
alleging they shot down the plane carrying then Rwanda president
Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundi’s Cyprian Ntaryamira over Kigali in
1994, setting off the last deadly phase of the genocide.
Not only has Sarkozy visited Rwanda and extended an olive branch,
but Kagame too went to Paris.
France is seen as more likely to be willing to soil its hands in
Somalia than the Americans, who have preferred to use proxies and
drones, since their invasion of Somalia in 1992 ended in disaster
and humiliation.
This is particularly important for Kenya, as it will need someone
who is willing to share the bill for what looks set to be a
drawn-out and expensive campaign.
SOURCE:
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/
Faafin: SomaliTalk.com | Oct 30, 2011
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