London conference communique on Somalia is leaked (Feb 13, 2012), 10
days before the conference.
Prime Minister David Cameron gives a speech at the Apex Hotel on Feb.
16, 2012 in Edinburgh, Scotland. Source: Globalpost
Globalpost said about the leaked document "NAIROBI, Kenya — Oh dear,
this is embarrassing for the British government. A number of Somali-run websites
have got their hands on a leaked copy of a draft communique to be issued after
the London conference on Somalia. The international summit has been convened by
Prime Minister David Cameron and will address piracy, terrorism and the root
causes of Somalia's state collapse. This is a tall order for a five-hour meeting
with more than 40 countries represented. The problem with the communique is
that the conference hasn't happened yet: It is due to take place on Feb. 23.
Here is the leaked Document and pay attention to number 7 below (We
agreed that in August the functions of government should pass to a caretaker
authority until the constitutional discussions concluded).
Leaked on Monday, February 13, 2012
LONDON CONFERENCE ON SOMALIA: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
1. The London Conference on Somalia took place at Lancaster House on 23rd
February 2012, attended by around fifty representatives from the international
community, and from Somalia itself.
2. We agreed that this is a critical time in Somalia's history. Life for most
Somalis has got consistently worse over the past few years. A generation of
Somalis has grown up knowing nothing but conflict. The humanitarian crisis
continues: the United Nations has said that the situation in Somalia remains the
most critical in the world. It is time to turn the tide. Current governance
arrangements come to an end in six months, in August, and Somalis want clarity
on what will follow. African troops have successfully established a good measure
of security in Mogadishu over the last twelve months. Advances by other forces
have liberated areas formerly held by Al Shabaab. And at sea, international
action against piracy has secured the international trade route in the Gulf of
3. So we met in London to take stock, and to take decisions which will sustain
the momentum of change. We wanted to show Somalia and the world that there is
solidarity among the international community; that we are committed to
supporting Somalia's continued emergence from its former status as a failed
state; and that we recognise the importance of new actors on Somalia, especially
Turkey and Qatar, in helping Somalia's future development.
Humanitarian [Language to be amended by DFID and other humanitarian actors]
4. The Conference was preceded by a separate meeting on humanitarian issues.
Participants expressed concern at the critical humanitarian situation in
Somalia. Four million people require emergency assistance; three million are in
the South of Somalia, where famine and risk of imminent death remains for
250,000 people. They agreed that:
- Drought has become famine in South Somalia because of conflict and insecurity;
ending conflict is key to ending the current and future risk of famine.
- Participants would provide timely, sustained and principled support to
humanitarian organisations to ensure assistance reaches those who need it, when
they need it, and regardless of political considerations;
- International partners needed to move beyond just life saving assistance and
provide more multi-year support to longer-term activities including for
livelihood and basic social services, in order to strengthen people's resilience
to shocks and stresses, and contribute to reducing the risk of future famines;
and - International partners would coordinate more closely on humanitarian
assistance in order to maximise the coverage of needs we can meet
5. We agreed that the transition must end, and that the political process must
now connect with the people of Somalia. We considered how the international
community could support Somalis to accelerate decision-making on their future
political structures. In this context, we noted the conclusions of the African
Union Summit that: ...... We made clear that nobody would agree to the roll-over
of the Transitional Federal Institutions in August. We were interested in
process not individuals. We called on the Transitional Federal Institutions to
make as much progress on the Roadmap as possible before August.
6. We noted the intention expressed at the Garowe meeting in December to convene
a Constituent Assembly. We called on the Garowe signatories to enhance the
proposed process to ensure that members of the Constituent Assembly were
genuinely representative of communities across Somalia; and that the Assembly
had adequate time to discuss the four key outstanding constitutional questions:
whether Somalia should have a centralised or federal state; the boundaries of
the constituent regions; whether Somalia should adopt a cabinet or presidential
system of government; and the role of religion in the state. We also noted that
decisions on the shape of the parliament must be taken within the framework of
the discussion on the constitution.
7. We agreed that in August the functions of government should pass to a
caretaker authority until the constitutional discussions concluded. The
constitution itself must be endorsed by the people of Somalia in a referendum,
or by an elected parliament once democratic elections have been held. We agreed
to review progress on the Constituent Assembly at the Istanbul Conference in
June, and encouraged the Secretary General of the United Nations to include an
update on this in his regular reports to the Security Council.
8. We noted that corruption drives the war economy in Somalia, distorting the
incentives of the authorities and reducing finance available for development and
service delivery. One consequence is that some international trade is driven
towards Kismayo port, which in some ways is a more reliable business environment
than Mogadishu port. Somalia has important economic assets, which need to be
used much more to benefit its people. We welcomed the launch of a Joint
Financial Management Board between the Transitional Federal Government and
donors. We noted the importance of mutual accountability between the authorities
and the international community. The Board will ensure the good management of
Somalia's domestic economic assets and revenues, and international aid, allowing
Somalis themselves to monitor financial flows and to hold their leaders and the
international community to account. We called upon relevant international
agencies to accelerate feasibility studies for better and more transparent
management of ports and airports, including Mogadishu port, and committed
ourselves to supporting measures to implement these.
9. We talked about the role of Al Shabaab. We agreed that there was no place for
violent extremism or foreign terrorists in Somalia, and we would continue to
support the fight against them. But we also agreed that there would be a place
for Islamic political parties in a future peaceful Somalia. We invited all those
willing to reject violence as a political weapon to join the discussions on the
future constitution of Somalia, which will determine the role of religion for
the Somali nation.
8. . We also agreed that international standards of human rights and probity of
behaviour in public life should prevail in Somalia. We noted that the role of
the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights in monitoring human rights
violations, and in recommending how the Somali authorities, with the support of
the international community could strengthen accountability for human rights
violations and abuses. We agreed that individuals who diverted funds or aid
intended for the benefit of the people of Somalia, or who sought to block or
disrupt progress towards peaceful and stable government, should be held
accountable, and we agreed to consider specific proposals in this regard at the
Istanbul Conference. We agreed that the international community would uphold
previously agreed sanctions by stopping engagement with those known to be
involved in corruption, and agreed to adopt the following measures [whatever is
agreed]. We also agreed to redouble efforts to comply with UNSC Resolutions and
strengthen controls over vessels involved in illicit trade with Somalia.
11. We agreed that greater security in Somalia was essential to allow
development and a more stable and inclusive political process. We welcomed the
United Nations/ African Union plan for coordinated military engagement by the
regional powers and Transitional Federal Government, and [wording on UNSCR on
increase in support for AMISOM, if agreed before the Conference]. We also
welcomed the agreement of the European Commission to continue funding the
salaries of AU soldiers on the ground [If agreed].
[12. We agreed that for lasting security Somalia must develop its own
professional and accountable security forces. To that end, we agreed principles
for the development of Somali armed forces, police and coastguard (Annex C), and
agreed to support that development in a coordinated way. AMISOM would over time
transition into a training mission. We agreed that the EU Training Mission
strengthens Somali national forces; and welcomed the agreement to provide
barracks for Somali forces in Mogadishu[If agreed], so they can concentrate on
their military tasks.
12. Equally important is the development of structures to provide justice for
the people of Somalia. We also agreed to support that sector by providing
coordinated and strategic support based upon key principles (Annex X). We agreed
to develop an international coordination structure for support to the Somali
security and justice sectors.
13. On piracy, we agreed that the roots of the issue are on land not at sea, and
our work on regional stability would be central to tackling the causes of
piracy. Nevertheless we agreed that there would be no impunity for pirates,
wherever they may be operating, under UNSCR 2015. As an interim measure some
participants had amended their law to allow the use of armed guards on their
flagged vessels: no vessel using armed guards has been successfully taken by
pirates. We noted that international naval operations had reduced the incidents
of piracy in the Gulf of Aden to their lowest levels since 2008 through
international naval operations. We welcomed the EU commitment to supporting
better maritime security arrangements from neighbouring states in East Africa.
14. We welcomed the arrangements some of us have instigated to allow us to
capture pirates at sea; transfer them to the jurisdiction of the Seychelles and
Mauritius for trial [and others]; and then if convicted, the transfer of
prisoners to internationally certified prisons in Puntland and Somaliland. These
arrangements will be extended, to ensure a virtuous and effective circle of
arrest, trial and imprisonment from sea to Somalia.
15. Finally, we noted the creation of a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and
Information Coordination centre in the Seychelles which will look at disrupting
the money involved in piracy activity and seek to prosecute those who benefit
from the proceeds of crime.
16. We expressed our concern that terrorism linked to Somalia posed a serious
threat to Somalia itself, to the region and to the wider world. The continuing
terrorist campaign by violent extremists has inflicted untold suffering on the
Somali population. We acknowledged the importance of the wider work to develop a
more stable and secure Somalia in achieving a long-term solution to the problem.
But we also agreed that, in the meantime, the international community and the
countries in the region had to work together with greater determination to
develop capacity to disrupt terrorism across the region. This means stopping the
movement of terrorists to and from Somalia, disrupting the flow of their
finances, and delivering effective intelligence gathering, investigation,
criminal prosecution and detention against them. We encouraged the relevant
regional and international fora to drive forward international co-operation to
produce concrete results in these areas.
Stability and Recovery
17. We agreed that support to existing and emerging local areas of stability can
play a crucial role in building peace and security for the Somali people. We
talked about how the two approaches of supporting local (bottom up) and national
(top down) stability should reinforce each other. A local stability approach can
build positive incentives for local areas of stability to join a national
political process, increasing its inclusion and credibility, and strengthening
the process to build a legitimate central authority in Mogadishu after August
18. We also agreed that the local stability approach can deliver immediate
development benefits for ordinary Somali men and women – notably by improving
their safety and security and their access to economic opportunities, services,
and to the benefits of reconstruction. We noted that quick wins such as this
would be particularly important in newly emerging areas of stability.
19. We endorsed a set of principles for international support to areas of
stability [Annex D] and [placeholder: discussion on merits of establishing a
Stability Fund ongoing. If agreed, we should include announcement of
21. Finally, we discussed the way in which the international community
coordinates its approach to Somalia. We agreed that there needed to be effective
mechanisms to ensure that progress made in London was carried forward to the
Istanbul Conference and beyond. The International Contact Group on Somalia will
continue to provide a forum for agreeing international community positions. We
agreed on the need to restructure that group, establishing working groups to
address international community support on the key issues of the political
process, security, development, and human rights, with each working group
convened by a lead nation. We agreed to put proposals in this regard to the next
meeting of the International Contact Group.
22. We also agreed that a core group of Fifteen states and organisations would
lead work on supporting Somalia with the United Nations. The group would hold
open a sixteenth place for the permanent government of Somalia, once elected.
They recommended that this core group report back to the international community
every six months at the International Contact Group meetings. We looked forward
to taking work on Somalia forward at the Istanbul Conference, and at the Abu
Dhabi Conference on international piracy in June.
22 . We highlighted the central role of the United Nations Political Office for
Somalia (UNPOS) in facilitating progress towards peace and stability in Somalia.
We welcomed the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary General,
Mr Mahiga in this regard. We called on UNPOS to improve and strengthen their
operations to ensure adequate support to the Somali people in carrying out the
challenging tasks ahead. We encouraged more effective coordination between the
UN entities working on Somalia.
4. We recognised the important role played in Somalia by the diaspora and by
civil society, which are critical actors in the political, economic, security
and humanitarian affairs of Somalia. Although attendance at the conference was
reserved for governments and international institutions, Somali views, including
those of the diaspora, were sought in advance of the event. Looking forward, we
agreed to work together with Somali diaspora communities and civil society to
help shape a better future for Somalia.
23. The responsibility for stemming Somalia's decline rests with Somalis and in
Somalia. We agreed that, as partners of Somalia, we would deliberately spend
less of our time in Nairobi and other capitals, and more time in Mogadishu and
other Somali cities. A number of us have recently opened Embassies in Mogadishu
and appointed Ambassadors. Others are planning to do so. We look forward to the
day when a conference on Somali issues can be held inside Somalia.
Draft list of Annexes
A Humanitarian donor activity
B Political Process
C Security Sector Reform/AMISOM
D Local Stability Principles
E Terms of Reference for JFMB
F Slide showing proposed international coordination structures